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WHAT IS A "MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIP"?: AN
ANALYSIS OF COHABITANT PROPERTY RIGHTS
UNDER CONNELL v. FRANCISCO
Gavin M. Parr
Abstract: In the 1995 case Connell v. Francisco, the Supreme Court of Washington
adopted an innovative and groundbreaking rule to resolve the property rights of cohabitants
upon separation. After Connell,upon termination of a "meretricious relationship," a trial court
must perform a just and equitable distribution of the property acquired during the relationship
that would have been community property had the parties been married. In adopting this rule,
the supreme court sought to resolve property rights arising out of cohabitation in a predictable
and equitable manner while maintaining the distinction between marriage and cohabitation.
Unfortunately, the meretricious relationship fiction the court adopted as a prerequisite to ajust
and equitable distribution tends to frustrate these goals. This Comment proposes that the
supreme court replace the meretricious relationship fiction with a rule requiring trial courts to
perform ajust and equitable distribution on the termination of any "intimate cohabitation.'

Although Washington is a frontrunner in resolving property rights of
unmarried cohabitants upon separation, the rule the Supreme Court of
Washington adopted to resolve such rights creates uncertainty and
inequity. The court of appeals' holding in Pennington v. Pennington'
illustrates these problems. In Pennington, the parties cohabited without
marriage for ten years, although they lived separately on two occasions
during the last four years of their relationship.2 The man owned their
residences, but each party contributed to furnishing and improving them,
and they shared household expenses.3 The local phone book listed them
together under the man's surname, and members of the community
testified that they cared for each other "as a husband and wife would." 4
The woman even quit her job to care for the man after he suffered a
stroke.5 Nevertheless, relying primarily on three factors, the court of
appeals held that there was not substantial evidence of a "meretricious
relationship" and reversed the trial court's just and equitable distribution
of property.6 First, the man had been legally married to, although
separated from, another woman during the first five years of the
1. 93 Wash. App. 913, 971 P.2d 98 (1999).
2. See id at 914-16,971 P.2d at 99-100.
3. See id.at 914-15, 971 P.2d at 99-100.
4. Id. at 915-16,971 P.2d at 99-100.
5. See id.at 915, 971 P.2d at 99-100.
6. See id. at 920, 971 P.2d at 102.
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cohabitation. 7 Second, the man denied the woman's testimony that they
were engaged and testified that he had repeatedly refused her requests
that they marry.8 Third, the parties lived separately on two occasions
during the latter part of their relationship, including one month during
which the woman lived with another man.' In any other state, the court's
refusal to apply equitable principles to divide property acquired during
the parties' cohabitation would be par for the course; in Washington, the
result is illustrative of the shortcomings in the state's innovative but
flawed law in this area.
0
In Connell v. Francisco,'
the Supreme Court of Washington adopted
a rule requiring courts to perform a "just and equitable distribution" on
the termination by separation of certain intimate, nonmarital cohabiting
relationships." However, the court announced that the rule would apply
only when the parties had lived in a "meretricious relationship," a legal
fiction defined as "a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties
cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not
exist.""2 The court also limited the property that courts should distribute
to property acquired during the meretricious relationship that would have
been community property had the parties been married. 3
Connell places Washington at the forefront of recognizing the legal
rights of cohabitants. However, the rules Connell adopted fail to achieve
fully the court's goals. Parts I and II of this Comment discuss
Washington courts' historical treatment of the property rights of intimate,
nonmarital cohabitants and how Connell changed that treatment. Part III
argues that because the meretricious relationship fiction promotes both
uncertainty and inequity, it defeats the very goals of Connell. Part IV
urges the supreme court to replace the Connell meretricious relationship
fiction with a rule that requires courts to perform a just and equitable
distribution upon the termination of any "intimate cohabitation."

7. See id at 918-19, 971 P.2d at 101.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. 127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995).
11. Id. at 351,898 P.2d at 836.
12. Id at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.
13. See id. at 350, 898 P.2d at 836.
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I.

WASHINGTON COURTS' HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INTIMATE, UNMARRIED
COHABITANTS

Washington courts' approach to resolving cohabitant property rights
has evolved over time. Initially, courts applied a bright-line rule and
awarded property acquired during cohabitation to the title-holding party.
However, courts routinely criticized this rule, suggesting and carving out
a number of alternative theories. Ultimately, the supreme court expressly
overruled the bright-line rule and applied certain dissolution-of-marriage
statutes by analogy.
A.

Creasman v. Boyle and the Creasman Presumption

In Creasman v. Boyle, 4 the Supreme Court of Washington applied a
bright-line rule regarding the property rights of intimate, unmarried
cohabitants. 5 In that case, the couple cohabited for seven years, holding
themselves out as husband and wife until the woman's death. 6 During
their cohabitation, the woman entered into a contract to purchase their
mutual residence, making the down payment by exchanging the man's
automobile. 7 She took title to the residence in her name alone, but made
payments using money the man earned while they lived together. 8 After
the woman's death, the man brought an action to obtain title to the
residence. 9 The trial court awarded him a one-half interest in the
property, noting that although he had been the sole financial contributor,
2
the woman had contributed by way of her "thrift' and "housekeeping.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed and ordered the trial court to
award the residence to the woman's estate." The court held that
"property acquired by a man and a woman not married to each other, but
living together as husband and wife, is not community property, and, in
the absence of some trust relation, belongs to the one in whose name the

14 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).

15. See id.at 351-52, 196 P.2d at 838.
16. See id at 347-49, 196 P.2d at 836-37.

17. See id.at 348, 196 P.2d at 836-37.
18. See id at 348-49, 196 P.2d at 836-37.

19. See id at 346, 196 P.2d at 836.
20. Id. at 350-51, 196 P.2d at 838.
21. See id at 358, 196P.2d at 841.
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legal title to the property stands. 22 Furthermore, in what became known
as the "Creasman presumption," the court refused to find a resulting trust
in favor of the man, holding that "under these circumstances and in the
absence of any evidence [of intent] to the contrary, it should be presumed
as a matter of law that the parties intended to dispose of the property
exactly as they did dispose of it."23
B.

Erosion of Creasman: The Various Exceptions Recognized

Within a few years, the supreme court began routinely to criticize the
logic and effect of Creasman. In a concurring opinion in 1957, Justice
Finley stated: "The rule often operates to the great advantage of the
cunning and the shrewd, who wind up with possession of the property, or
title to it in their names, at the end of a so-called meretricious
relationship. ' 24 The court later suggested in dictum that "Creasman
should be overruled and its archaic presumption invalidated. 2 5
Consistent with this criticism, courts created several exceptions to
Creasman's "title rule." One exception was the so-called "innocent
relationship," where either or both parties in good faith enter into a
marriage that proves to be void.26 In such cases, a court in equity would
protect the rights of the innocent party or parties by performing a just and
equitable disposition of property on the annulment of the void marriage
as if the parties had been married.27 Similarly, other cases held Creasman
inapplicable where the parties were involved in a joint venture or implied
partnership, 2 or where they had entered into a valid contract.2 9 Finally,
two courts refused to apply Creasman where they could trace title to
22. Id. at351, 196 P.2d at 838.
23. Id. at 356, 196 P.2d at 841.
24. West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311, 316,311 P.2d 689, 693 (1957).
25. In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 79,499 P.2d 864, 867 (1972).
26. See Creasman,31 Wash. 2d at 352, 196 P.2d at 838-39.
27. See Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash. 2d 558, 566, 236 P.2d 1044, 1049-50 (1951); Creasman,31
Wash. 2d at 352, 196 P.2d at 838-39.
28. See Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d at 75, 499 P.2d at 865 (holding prima facie case of implied
partnership was established where woman helped manage and operate ranch); Poole, 39 Wash. 2d at
564-65, 236 P.2d at 1048-49 (holding tavern to be "joint venture" entitling woman to just and
equitable distribution irrespective of meretricious relationship where man held title but both parties
contributed money and labor).
29. See Dahlgren v. Blomeen, 49 Wash. 2d 47, 54, 298 P.2d 479, 483 (1956) (upholding trust for
benefit of surviving partner where decedent promised, for valid consideration, to devise and
bequeath property to survivor).
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property acquired during cohabitation to the separate property of either
or both parties.3"
Alternatively, the non-title-holding party in a meretricious relationship
could avoid Creasman by establishing that a trust relation existed.3 A
constructive trust generally requires a showing of fraud, overreaching,
breach of fiduciary duty, or other inequitable conduct on the part of the
title-holding party;32 however, one court found a constructive trust solely
because of the unconscionable result that application of Creasman would
have achieved.33 A resulting trust requires evidence that the parties
intended one party to hold the property in trust for the other who had
furnished the consideration for its purchase. 4 The supreme court
affirmed application of this theory in Walberg v. Mattson," where the
man purchased property with his own funds but placed title in the
woman's name to avoid potential difficulties in encumbering or
transferring the property because he was married to another woman.36
C.

Advent of the MeretriciousRelationship Concept

While criticizing Creasmanand often avoiding its effects, the supreme
court also explored two new theories. One was that courts might apply
community property laws by analogy to determine property ownership at
the end of a meretricious relationship.37 The other theory was that courts

30. See Shull v. Shepherd, 63 Wash. 2d 503, 507, 387 P.2d 767, 769-70 (1963) (holding that
parties were cotenants in proportion to their respective contributions when they took title as husband
and wife and made mortgage payments with separate funds); West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311,
313, 311 P.2d 689, 691 (1957) ("No presumptions arise as to property which can be traced to one or
the other. It belongs to the original owner.").
31. Creasman'stitle rule did not apply where a trust relation existed between the parties. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
32. See Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wash. 2d 376,389-90,407 P.2d 967, 974 (1965).
33. See Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 393, 534 P.2d 957, 961 (1974). The parties had
formerly been husband and wife and divorced solely for purposes of gaining U.S. citizenship. Once
divorced, they continued to combine their earnings for the benefit of the community and their
children until separating ten years later. Under the parties' arrangement, the woman turned her
paychecks over to the man, who used the funds to pay for living expenses and to purchase property
to which he took title. See id. at 388, 534 P.2d at 958-59.
34. See Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 812,232 P.2d 827, 829 (1951).
35. 38 Wash. 2d 808,232 P.2d 827 (1951).
36. See id. at 813,232 P.2d at 830.
37. See Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1976); In re Estate of
Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72,76-77,499 P.2d 864,866 (1972).
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acquired during such a relationship on a just
could distribute property
38
and equitable basis.
In In re Marriageof Lindsey,39 the supreme court adopted these two
new theories. The parties had lived together for twenty months prior to
their marriage, during which time they built a barn/shop on the man's
separate property.4" After a six-year marriage, the parties divorced. 41 For
purposes of performing a just and equitable disposition pursuant to
RCW 26.09.080,42 the trial court applied Creasman to characterize fire
insurance proceeds from the barn/shop as the man's separate property.
The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding the characterization a
manifest abuse of discretion.' Expressly overruling the Creasman
presumption, the court held that courts must "examine the [meretricious]
relationship and the property accumulations
and make a just and
45
property."
the
of
disposition
equitable

II.

CURRENT LAW: CONNELL v. FRANCISCO

In Connell v. Francisco,46 the supreme court extended Lindsey to
certain cohabitations that end in separation without marriage. The court
38. See Latham, 87 Wash. 2d at 554, 554 P.2d at 1059; see also West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d
311, 320,311 P.2d 689, 695 (1957) (Finley, J., concurring).
39. 101 Wash. 2d 299,678 P.2d 328 (1984).
40. See id. at 300-01, 678 P.2d at 329.
41. See id.
42. The statute provides:
the court shall... make such disposition of
In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage ....
the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just
and equitable after considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is
to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for reasonable periods to a spouse with whom the children reside the majority of the
time.
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.080 (1998).
43. See Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 301, 678 P.2d at 329.
44.
45.
1057,
46.

See id. at 307, 678 P.2d at 332.
Id.at 304, 678 P.2d at 331 (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d
1059 (1976)) (alteration in original).
127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995).
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most likely intended to make the resolution of cohabitant property rights
more equitable and predictable than it had been under Creasman.
However, under Connell and Lindsey the legal consequences of

cohabitation depend on how cohabitation ends and whether or not it was
a meretricious relationship.
A.

The Connell Decision

After Lindsey, the extent to which the just and equitable disposition
principle applied to cohabitations that ended in separation without
marriage was unclear.47 In 1994, the court of appeals considered this
issue in Connell v. Francisco. The trial court found the parties'

relationship sufficiently long-term and stable to come within the Lindsey
rule.48 Consequently, it performed a just and equitable disposition of
property that would have been community property had the couple been
married,4 9 applying by analogy RCW 26.09.080.0 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that all property of the parties should have been before
the court,5 and that the trial court erred in not applying the community
property presumption to property acquired during the meretricious
relationship.5 2
On appeal, the supreme court announced several principles for courts
to apply on the termination of cohabitation, presumably in the absence of

an enforceable agreement to the contrary. 3 First, a trial court must
47. Several court of appeals decisions purported to apply Lindsey to such relationships before the
Connell decision. See Zion Constr., Inc. v. Gilmore, 78 Wash. App. 87, 91, 895 P.2d 864, 866
(1995); Connell v. Francisco, 74 Wash. App. 306, 316-17, 872 P.2d 1150, 1156 (1994), revd in
part, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995); Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App. 880, 885, 812 P.2d
523,526 (1991).
48. See Connell, 74 Wash. App. at 310, 872 P.2d at 1153.
49. See infra note 59. In Washington, community property is any property acquired during
marriage by husband or wife that is not separate property. See Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.030 (1998).
Separate property is property owned by either spouse prior to marriage, property acquired by either
spouse during marriage by gift or inheritance, and the rents and profits of the separate property of
either spouse. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.16.010-.020 (1998).
50. See Connell, 74 Wash. App. at 315-16, 872 P.2d at 1156; supranote 42.
51. See Connell, 74 Wash. App. at 316-17, 872 P.2d at 1156.
52. See id. at 318, 872 P.2d at 1157. Courts presume that property acquired during marriage is
community property. See Harry M. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington (Revised
1985), 61 Wash. L. Rev. 13, 56 (1986).
53. No court has considered whether Connell is mandatory law or whether it applies only where
parties have not entered into an enforceable contract to the contrary. Assuming the latter, courts also
have not considered the type of agreement needed to contract into or out of Connells equitable
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perform a "just and equitable distribution"54 of property on the
termination of cohabitation, but only if the relationship was
"meretricious."" Connell defined "meretricious relationship" as "a
stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with
knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.' 56
Relevant factors include: "continuous cohabitation, duration of the
relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and
services for joint projects, and the intent of the parties."57 Second, the
court's just and equitable distribution is limited to property that would
have been community property had the parties been married 5 8-in other
words, the relationship's "pseudo-community property."59 Third, Connell
held that courts should apply by analogy the statutory definitions of
separate and community property' and should presume that property
onerously acquired during a meretricious relationship is pseudocommunity property. 61
B.

The Goals ofConnell

Though not expressly stated in its opinion, the court's goals in Connell
were most likely to make the resolution of cohabitant property rights
equitable and predictable without equating cohabitation with marriage. In
principles. Presumably courts will apply by analogy the two-part test used to determine the
enforceability of prenuptial agreements. See In re Marriage of Matson, 107 Wash. 2d 479, 482-83,
730 P.2d 668, 671-72 (1986).
54. Although RCW 26.09.080 characterizes a trial court's action on dissolution as a "disposition,"
see supra note 42, Connell used the language "distribution" to characterize a trial court's action on
termination of a meretricious relationship. See Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 352, 898
P.2d 831, 837 (1995). Presumably, the court intended to emphasize the distinction between these
processes.
55. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 347, 898 P.2d at 834-35. Because judicial intervention is not
required to terminate a meretricious relationship, as it is for marriage, a just and equitable
distribution will occur only where either or both parties petition the court after the relationship ends.
56. Id. at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.
57. Id.
58. See id.at 349-50, 898 P.2d at 836.
59. Courts have not named income and property acquired by parties during a meretricious
relationship that would be community property had the parties been married. It is inappropriate to
label it "community property" because courts apply the definitions of community and separate
property to meretricious relationships only by analogy. Moreover, the legislature already uses the
term "quasi-community property" for other purposes. See infra note 66. Consequently, this
Comment refers to such property as "pseudo-community property."
60. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 351, 898 P.2d at 836; supra note 49.
61. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 351, 898 P.2d at 836; supra note 52.
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overruling Creasman,the Lindsey court found the "constricting dictates"
of the Creasman presumption to have made the law "unpredictable and
at times onerous."'62 It follows that Lindsey's goals were to make the law
more predictable and less onerous, and that these goals also motivated
Connell's extension of Lindsey. The Connell court itself characterized
the various exceptions to the Creasman presumption as having the
purpose of avoiding "inequitable results."'63 Because Connell replaced
these exceptions, it presumably has this same goal. The Connell court
also explained that its rule would prevent unjust enrichment at the end of
meretricious relationships.' Finally, the court reasoned that its holding
would achieve an equitable result "without creating a common-law
marriage or making a decision for a couple which they have declined to
make for themselves." 65
C.

The Legal Consequences ofInvolvement in a Meretricious
Relationship

Courts have delineated many, but not all, of the legal consequences of
involvement in a meretricious relationship. It is largely uncertain what
consequences arise during the meretricious relationship itself. There are
clear legal consequences on the termination of a meretricious relationship; however, the consequences depend on how the relationship ends.
1.

Legal ConsequencesDuringa MeretriciousRelationship

The supreme court has not considered whether parties involved in a
meretricious relationship, or their creditors, have a present interest in the
pseudo-community property of the relationship, or if the interest is
inchoate until the court performs a just and equitable distribution.' The
62. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299,304, 678 P.2d 328,331 (1984).
63. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 347, 898 P.2d at 834.
64. See id at 349, 898 P.2d at 836.
65. Id. at 350, 898 P.2d at 836.
66. If the interest is inchoate until the court performs a just and equitable distribution, pseudocommunity property is analogous to quasi-community property. See Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 26.16.220-.250 (1998). "Quasi-community property" is real or personal property that is not
community property because the decedent acquired it while domiciled in a non-community-property
state, but which would have been the community property of the decedent and his or her spouse had
the decedent been domiciled in Washington at the time he or she acquired the property. See Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.16.220(1). As with pseudo-community property, the legal presumptions and
principles applicable to characterizing community and separate property apply to characterizing
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court of appeals held that property onerously acquired during a
meretricious relationship has a pseudo-community property character
from inception.67 However, it is uncertain whether this holding merely
articulates a tracing principle, or if it confers on the non-acquiring party
an actual present interest in the pseudo-community property. On a
different note, courts have consistently held that cohabitants do not have
the same rights as spouses under state statutes. 8
2.

Legal Consequences on Termination of a MeretriciousRelationship

The legal consequences of involvement in a meretricious relationship
depend on how cohabitation ends: marriage that ends in the death of one
or both parties, the death of one or both parties without marriage,
marriage that the parties later dissolve, or separation without marriage.
No court has considered the effect of Connell where a marriage preceded
by premarital cohabitation ends in the death of one or both spouses.
Furthermore, no reported case has decided whether Connell applies to a
meretricious relationship that ends in death. One unreported decision has
suggested in dictum that the trial court should perform a just and
equitable distribution of pseudo-community property in this situation.69
If the parties' cohabitation ends in a marriage that they later dissolve,
RCW 26.09.080 already requires the trial court to perform a just and
equitable disposition of all property of the parties.7" As a result, there is
quasi-community property. See Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.220(3). However, in contrast to true
community property, the non-acquiring spouse has no present interest in quasi-community property.
Instead, courts use the characterization solely for the purpose of disposition of such property on the
decedent's death. See Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.250.
67. See Koher v. Morgan, 93 Wash. App. 398, 403-04, 968 P.2d 920, 922 (1998); In re Marriage
of Lindemann, 92 Wash. App. 64, 73, 960 P.2d 966, 971 (1998).
68. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Ace Hardware Corp., 134 Wash. 2d 748, 750, 953 P.2d 88, 89 (1998)
(holding that "marital status" under employment discrimination statute does not include meretricious
relationship); Peffley-Wamer v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 253, 778 P.2d 1022, 1027 (1989)
(holding that surviving partner to meretricious relationship is not "widow" under Washington
intestacy statute); Davis v. Department of Employment Sec., 108 Wash. 2d 272, 273, 737 P.2d 1262,
1264 (1987) (holding that meretricious relationship is not within "marital status" exception to
disqualification from unemployment compensation); Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc., 46 Wash. App.
816, 819, 732 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1987) (holding that unmarried cohabitant is not "wife" under
wrongful death statute); see also Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App. 880, 888, 812 P.2d 523, 527
(1991) (holding that party petitioning court for property distribution on termination of meretricious
relationship is not entitled to attorney fees); Western Community Bank v. Helmer, 48 Wash. App.
694, 699, 740 P.2d 359, 362 (1987) (same).
69. See In re Estate of Anderson, No. 14572-7-M, 1997 WL 6984, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1997).
70. See supranote 42.
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no need to apply the statute by analogy. Thus, Lindsey requires a court
simply to consider the cohabitation and the property accumulations
therein as relevant factors when making the statutory just and equitable
disposition of the parties' separate and community property.7 '
An unanswered question is whether Connell's meretricious
relationship test independently affects the statutory just and equitable
disposition. The Lindsey court did not decide whether all premarital
cohabitations are relevant in the statutory disposition, or if only
meretricious relationships as defined in Connell are relevant.72 Moreover,
Lindsey did not instruct courts how to apply the cohabitation factor other
than to say that courts must examine the relationship and the property
accumulations.73
In practice, the court of appeals applies the Connell meretricious
relationship test in dissolution actions solely to characterize property
acquired during the parties' premarital cohabitation.74 Under this line of
cases, a trial court may not simply tack the period of premarital
cohabitation onto the length of the marriage; rather, it must engage in a
three-step analysis. First, it must examine the parties' premarital
cohabitation to determine if it was meretricious. Second, based on this
determination, it must characterize property acquired during the parties'
premarital cohabitation as separate or pseudo-community property
pursuant to Connell.76 Third, it must perform a just and equitable
disposition of all property of the parties pursuant to RCW 26.09.080,
treating as community property the pseudo-community property from the
parties' premarital cohabitation, and treating as separate property the
property that is neither community nor pseudo-community property.77
Under this line of cases, it is uncertain whether nonmeretricious
71. See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
72. See In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d299, 304-05,678 P.2d 328,331(1984) (passing
on issue because parties did not contest existence of meretricious relationship).
73. See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
74. See In re Marriage of Kinzer, No. 16035-1-IIL 1998 WL 151795, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr.

2, 1998) (affirming trial court's determination that parties' premarital cohabitation was
meretricious); In re Marriage of Damon-Rau, No. 4831-11-1, 1997 WL 671997, at *2 (Wash. Ct.

App. Oct. 24, 1997) (holding that trial court did not err in finding parties' premarital cohabitation
meretricious); see also In re Marriage of DeHollander, 53 Wash. App. 695, 698-99, 770 P.2d 638,

641 (1989) (holding that because parties' premarital cohabitation was meretricious, trial court did
not err in characterizing property acquired during relationship as community).

75. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 42.
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cohabitation, in itself, is a factor courts may consider in making the
statutory just and equitable disposition.
If the parties simply cohabited without ever marrying, the effect of
Connell is three-fold when they separate. First, the trial court must
examine the parties' cohabiting relationship and determine if it was
meretricious.78 Second, if the relationship was meretricious, the trial
court must characterize the income and property acquired during the
relationship as pseudo-community or separate property by analogizing
the cohabitation to marriage and applying community property
principles.79 However, if the relationship was nonmeretricious, all
income and property acquired during the relationship is the separate
property of the acquiring party.8" Finally, if the parties' relationship was
meretricious, the trial court must perform a just and equitable distribution
of all pseudo-community property of the parties.8"
Although no court has considered what remedies are available to a
non-title-holding party after termination of a nonmeretricious relationship in the Connell era, the Creasman presumption and its various
exceptions would likely apply. In purporting to overrule Creasman,
Connell adopted a rule that applies only to parties involved in a
meretricious relationship. If the supreme court intended to overrule
Creasman with regard to nonmeretricious relationships, it presumably
would have announced a rule in its stead. Therefore, Connell's limited
holding would almost certainly recognize a cause of action under one of
the Creasmanexceptions.82
D.

What Is a MeretriciousRelationship?

Despite the important legal consequences of involvement in a
meretricious relationship, the supreme court has not precisely defined
when such a relationship exists. Instead, it is a question of application of

78. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
80. This is a negative implication of Connell. See Pennington v. Pennington, 93 Wash. App. 913,
920, 971 P.2d 98, 102 (1999) (reversing trial court's just and equitable distribution of pseudocommunity property and remanding for further proceedings because trial court erred in finding
existence of meretricious relationship); Fletcher v. Olmstead, No. 19319-11, 1996 WL 734263, at
*1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1996) (affirming trial court order denying party involved in nonmeretricious relationship any portion of winning lottery ticket purchased by her cohabitant).

81. See supranotes 55-61 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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law to fact determined on a case-by-case basis." According to Connell's
definition, a relationship must satisfy three elements to be meretricious:
(1) it must be "stable," (2) it must be "marital-like," and (3) the parties
must "cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does
not exist."'
1.

The Parties'RelationshipMust Be Stable

To be meretricious, the parties' relationship must be stable. The
supreme court has not elaborated on what is required by this element of
the definition, other than to say that "continuous cohabitation!' and
"duration of the relationship" are two factors that courts should consider
in determining whether a meretricious relationship exists.85 In addition, a
"stormy" relationship may militate against a finding of stability. 6
a.

Continuous Cohabitation'

In evaluating the continuous cohabitation factor, case law appears to
have focused on two questions: whether the parties ever separated during
their cohabitation, and whether, during their relationship, either of the
parties ever cohabited with another person. Warden v. Warden"7 and
Penningtonv. Pennington8 illustrate courts' treatment of these factors.
In Warden, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's just and
equitable distribution, despite two periods of separation during the
parties' relationship. 9 After meeting in Canada, the parties moved to
California where they began cohabiting in 1963.90 In early 1967, the man
moved to New York for his employer, and the woman, pregnant with
83. See, e.g., Pennington,93 Wash. App. at 917-18,971 P.2d at 101.
84. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (1995); see supra notes 5557 and accompanying text There is a question of whether the supreme court intended the same test
to apply in evaluating premarital cohabitations and cohabitations that ended prior to marriage. See
supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. However, because the court of appeals has applied the
same test to both situations, see supranote 74 and accompanying text, this Comment does the same.
85. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 346, 898 P.2d at 834; see text accompanying supranote 57.
86. See In re Marriage of Rhoads, No. 4831-11-I, 645 P.2d 1153, 1153-54 (Wash. Ct. App. June
2, 1982) (not published in Washington Appellate Reports) (upholding application of Creasman
presumption where relationship was "short-lived and stormy").
87. 36 Wash. App. 693, 676 P.2d 1037 (1984).
88. 93 Wash. App. 913, 971 P.2d 98 (1999).
89. See Warden, 36 Wash. App. at 698,676 P.2d at 1039.
90. See id. at 694, 676 P.2d at 1037.
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their child, returned to Canada to give birth.9' They lived separately until
92
their daughter's birth in June 1967, when the man returned to Canada.
In 1969, they moved to Washington. 93 In 1972, the man moved to
California to secure employment and there married another woman.94
The woman in Canada did not learn of this marriage until 1977 and
believed that their relationship continued until that time.95 Despite these
two periods of separation and the man's marriage to another woman
during the last five years of the relationship, the court affirmed the
distribution of property, characterizing the relationship between 1963
and 1977 96as "tantamount to a marital family except for a legal
marriage.

In Pennington,the court of appeals reversed the trial court's finding of
a meretricious relationship. 97 The parties began living together in 1985,
when the woman moved into the man's residence. 98 In April 1991, when
the man refused to marry the woman, she moved out for a few weeks.99
In March 1993, the woman again moved out, this time for eighteen
months." During this separation, she lived with another man for one
month.' In October 1995, she moved out permanently.' On the issue
of continuous cohabitation, the trial court found that the parties "had a
continual and lengthy relationship during which there were two periods
of separation similar to those that might be experienced by a married
couple."'0 3 Even though the court of appeals held that these facts did not
justify finding a meretricious relationship, in dicta it agreed with the trial
court's conclusion that in analyzing the periods of separation, the court
must consider the entire duration of the relationship rather than the

91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id., 676 P.2d at 1037-38.
95. See id. at 694-95, 676 P.2d at 1038.
96. Id.at 698, 676 P.2d at 1039.
97. See Pennington v. Pennington, 93 Wash. App. 913, 920, 971 P.2d 98, 102 (1999).
98. See id. at 914,971 P.2d at 99.
99. See id. at 915, 971 P.2d at 99.
100. See id. at 916, 971 P.2d at 100.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 917 n.1, 971 P.2d at 100 n.1 (quoting trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law).
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separate periods of cohabitation."° The court also cited Warden
approvingly, characterizing it as holding that "a trial court may properly
consider the length and purpose of the relationship in determining that a
meretricious relationship existed, although the parties lived apart for
prolonged periods."' °5
b.

Durationof the Relationship

Duration is the other factor courts look at to determine if a relationship
was sufficiently stable to have been meretricious. °6 In Connell, the
supreme court stated: "While a 'long term' relationship is not a threshold
requirement, duration is a significant factor" in determining whether a
meretricious relationship exists. 07 No court has gone so far as to hold
that a relationship must last a certain amount of time before it can be
found to be meretricious. One court of appeals decision prior to Connell
found a four-month premarital cohabitation to have been meretricious, °8
but no other court has cited that case as authority that a meretricious
relationship can arise in that short a period. The meretricious relationship
in Lindsey lasted twenty months, and Connell cited Lindsey for the
proposition that "[a] 'short term' relationship may be characterized as
meretricious, but a number of significant and substantial factors must be
present."'0 9 More recently, three unreported court of appeals decisions
found meretricious relationships to exist where cohabitation lasted
between two and three years."0 However, courts have found
nonmeretricious relationships where cohabitation lasted five"' and even
2
ten years."

104. See ia at 920, 971 P.2d at 102.

105. IaH
106. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
107. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831,834 (1995).
108. See In re Marriage of DeHollander, 53 Wash. App. 695, 698, 770 P.2d 638, 641 (1989).
109. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.

110. See In re Marriage of Kinzer, No. 16035-1-rI, 1998 WL 151795, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr.
2, 1998) (23 months); In re Marriage of Damon-Rau, No. 19860-6-11, 1997 WL 671997, at *1
(Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1997) (27 months); In re Estate of Anderson, No. 14572-7-Il, 1997 WL
6984, at *1 (Wash. Ct App. Jan. 9, 1997) (37 months); see also Chesterfield v. Nash, 96 Wash. App.
103, 106, 978 P.2d 551,553 (1999) (51 months).
111. See Fletcher v. Olmstead, No. 19319-1-I, 1996 WiL 734263, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20,

1996).
112. See Pennington v. Pennington, 93 Wash. App. 913,914-16,971 P.2d 98, 99-100 (1999).
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The Parties'RelationshipMust Be Marital-Like

To be meretricious, the parties' relationship must be marital-like." 3
Four of the five Connell factors' 4 appear to serve as proxies for
determining whether a relationship is marital-like. "Cohabitation" distinguishes a meretricious relationship from situations where romantically
involved parties do not live together at the same residence and from nonintimate living arrangements. "Intent of the parties" provides evidence as
to whether the parties intend their relationship to be committed and
enduring. "Purpose of the relationship" evidences whether the parties
have undertaken the duties and responsibilities that normally attach to a
husband and wife. Finally, "pooling of resources and services to
accomplish common goals and projects" serves to determine whether the
parties' relationship is economically similar to marriage.
a.

Cohabitation

For a relationship to be marital-like, the parties must cohabit. Courts
have not clearly defined what cohabitation means in the meretricious
relationship context. However, in cases where the parties dated, were
sexually intimate, and even frequently spent the night at each other's
residences before they moved in together, courts have not considered the
pre-moving-in-together period as part of the meretricious relationship." 5
b.

Intent of the Partiesand Purpose of the Relationship

In analyzing the parties' intent and the purpose of the relationship to
determine if the relationship is sufficiently marital-like, courts appear to
have found several different factors important. The first is whether the
parties' relationship was functionally equivalent to marriage. For
example, one case found significant the woman's testimony that the
parties lived together because they were "two people in love, creating a

113. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
114. See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., In re Meretricious Relationship of Sutton & Widner, 85 Wash. App. 487, 489-91,
933 P.2d 1069, 1070-71 (1997) (characterizing meretricious relationship as existing only during
parties' actual cohabitation and not time during which they "stayed at each other's homes
regularly"); see also Pennington, 93 Wash. App. 913, 971 P.2d 98; Kinzer, 1998 WL 151795;
Damon-Rau, 1997 WL 671997.
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team relationship."'' 16 Some courts found significant that the parties
worked together to build their residence," 7 made major career and
residential moves based upon their committed relationship," 8 or made

retirement or estate plans with each other in mind." 9 Finally, some cases
2
2
discussed whether the parties were sexually intimate, ' shared a bed,' '
or had or were planning to have children together.'2
Another consideration appears to be whether the parties subjectively

treated their relationship as a marriage. In Warden, the court noted that
the parties had filed joint income tax returns as husband and wife."
Other courts have found important that the parties held themselves out as
married.' 4

116. Damon-Rau, 1997 WL 691997, at *2; see also In re Marriage of Hilt, 41 Wash. App. 434,
438, 704 P.2d 672, 675 (1985) (noting that man told woman that everything would be jointly
owned).

117. See, e.g., Sutton, 85 Wash. App. at 489-90, 933 P.2d at 1071; In re Estate of Anderson, No.
14572-7-IL, 1997 WL 6984, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1997); Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App.
880, 884, 812 P.2d 523, 526 (1991); In re Marriage of DeHollander, 53 Wash. App. 695, 696, 770
P.2d 638, 639-40 (1989).
118. See Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 343-44, 898 P.2d 831, 833 (noting that parties
made two major changes in residence together and jointly operated bed-and-breakfast
establishment); Damon-Rau, 1997 WL 671997, at *2 (noting that woman earned college degree
intended to help man's company); Zion Constr., Inc. v. Gilmore, 78 Wash. App. 87, 90, 895 P.2d
864, 866 (1995) (noting that parties made major change in residence); Warden v. Warden, 36 Wash.
App. 693, 694, 676 P.2d 1037, 1037 (1984) (noting that parties made three major changes in
residence). But see Pennington, 93 Wash. App. at 915-16, 971 P.2d at 99-100 (holding that
relationship was not meretricious even though parties made several moves together).
119. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 343, 898 P.2d at 833 (noting that man's will left corpus of
estate to woman); Chesterfield v. Nash, 96 Wash. App. 103, 108, 978 P.2d 551, 554 (1999) (noting
that parties made retirement plans together); Anderson, 1997 WL 6984, at *2 (noting that parties
planned to spend rest of their lives together); Foster, 61 Wash. App. at 885, 812 P.2d at 525-26
(noting that parties made retirement plans together); see also Fletcher v. Olmstead, No. 19319-1-1I,
1996 WL 734263, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1996) (noting that parties had not engaged in
estate planning together).
120. See Sutton, 85 Wash. App. at 491, 933 P.2d at 1071; Damon-Rau, 1997 WL 671997, at *2.
121. See Damon-Rau, 1997 WL 671997, at *2.
122. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 345, 898 P.2d at 833 (noting that parties had surgery to
enhance fertility); Chesterfield,96 Wash. App. at 108, 978 P.2d at 554 (noting that parties testified
they planned on having children together); Warden, 36 Wash. App. at 694, 676 P.2d at 1037 (noting
that parties had two children together); see also Pennington,93 Wash. App. at 918, 971 P.2d at 101
(distinguishing facts from Connell on grounds that Pennington parties had not sought fertility
treatment).
123. See Warden, 36 Wash. App. at 694, 676 P.2d at 1037.
124. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 343, 898 P.2d at 832; Foster,61 Wash. App. at 881, 812 P.2d
at 524. Butsee Pennington,93 Wash. App. at 916,971 P.2d at 100 (holding that relationship was not
meretricious even though members of community considered parties to be husband and wife).
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Courts have also considered whether the parties intended to marry.
Several courts found significant the parties' engagement during
cohabitation."z Similarly, Pennington found important the man's
testimony that he had repeatedly refused the woman's requests that they
marry, and his testimony denying the woman's claim that they
were
27
engaged." 6 That the parties were later married is also important.'
c.

Poolingof Resources and Services for JointProjects

The pooling of resources and services for joint projects is another
factor that Connell instructed courts to consider in determining whether a
relationship is meretricious.' 28 One type of pooling is sharing expenses.
Sharing household expenses, such as food, utilities, and rent, is not very

significant because it is common to both married couples and nonintimate roommates

and relatives. However,

some courts have

considered it in determining whether a meretricious relationship exists.'2 9
Paying for the other party's separate expenses with one's separate
property shows a slightly higher level of commitment between the
30

parties.1

Commingling earnings and separate funds is another factor that courts
consider. Several courts have considered joint bank accounts as evidence
of marital-like commitment,' 3 ' although it is not a requirement. 132 Other

125. See In re Estate of Anderson, No. 14572-7-1if, 1997 WL 6984, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 9,
1997); Zion Constr., Inc. v. Gilmore, 78 Wash. App. 87, 91, 895 P.2d 864, 866 (1995); Connell v.
Francisco, 74 Wash. App. 306, 309, 872 P.2d 1150, 1152 (1994), rev'd in part, 127 Wash. 2d 339,
898 P.2d 831 (1995); In re Marriage of DeHollander, 53 Wash. App. 695, 696, 770 P.2d 638, 639
(1989); In re Marriage of Hilt, 41 Wash. App. 434,438, 704 P.2d 672,675 (1985).
126. See Pennington,93 Wash. App. at 918-19, 971 P.2d at 102.
127. See In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 300, 678 P.2d 328, 329 (1984); In re
Marriage of Kinzer, No. 16035-1-1r1, 1998 WL 151795, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1998); In re
Marriage of Damon-Rau, No. 19860-6-11, 1997 WL 671997, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1997);
DeHollander,53 Wash. App. at 696,770 P.2d at 639; Hilt, 41 Wash. App. at 435, 704 P.2d at 673.
128. See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Chesterfield v. Nash, 96 Wash. App. 103, 106, 978 P.2d 551, 553 (1999) (noting
that parties pooled resources to pay joint living expenses); Pennington,93 Wash. App. at 915, 971
P.2d at 99 (noting that woman purchased food and other supplies while man paid mortgage and
utilities); Fletcher v. Olmstead, No. 19319-1-1, 1996 WL 734263, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20,
1996) (noting that although parties pooled money for rent, utilities, and groceries, they otherwise
kept financial affairs separate).
130. See, e.g., Zion Constr., 78 Wash. App. at 90, 895 P.2d at 866.
131. See, e.g., Kinzer, 1998 WL 151795, at *1; Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App. 880, 881, 812
P.2d 523, 524 (1991).
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courts found significant that the parties deposited
their earnings or
3
separate funds into each other's bank account.1

Where one or both parties purchase real estate or other large-scale
assets during cohabitation, how the parties take title, secure the loan, or

make payment can be very instructive in determining whether a
meretricious relationship exists. If the parties take title to such property

jointly, as cotenants, joint tenants, or even as "husband and wife," it 3is

strong evidence supporting the existence of a meretricious relationship. 1
The same is true where parties jointly pay for property or sign loan
documents. 35 Further, where both parties build or make improvements
on a home during the relationship, regardless of who holds title, courts
have found this to support finding a meretricious relationship. 3 6 The
converse is also true; where a party purchases property during
cohabitation with separate funds, takes title in his or her own name only,

and exhibits no intention to share ownership of137the property, it is

evidence against finding a meretricious relationship.
Finally, situations where the parties pool their labor also provide
strong evidence of a meretricious relationship. Three cases found a

132. See In re Meretricious Relationship of Sutton & Widner, 85 Wash. App. 487, 491, 933 P.2d
1069, 1071 (1997); Damon-Rau, 1997 WL 671997, at *2; Zion Constr., 78 Wash. App. at 91, 895
P.2d at 866.
133. See, e.g., Zion Constr., 78 Wash. App. at 90, 895 P.2d at 866; In re Marriage of Hilt, 41
Wash. App. 434,436,704 P.2d 672, 674 (1985).
134. See, e.g., Foster, 61 Wash. App. at 881-82, 812 P.2d at 524.
135. See, e.g., Chesterfield v. Nash, 96 Wash. App. 103, 106, 978 P.2d 551, 553 (1999) (noting
that parties pooled resources to make mortgage payments on residence in woman's name); Zion
Constr., 78 Wash. App. at 90-91, 895 P.2d at 866 (noting that woman contributed to closing costs
on residence, landscaping, and home repair expenses, although title was taken in man's name);
Foster,61 Wash. App. at 881-82, 812 P.2d at 524 (noting that parties obtained joint loan to build
home); In re Marriage of DeHollander, 53 Wash. App. 695, 696-97, 770 P.2d 638, 639-40 (1989)
(noting that both parties contributed money toward monthly payments and improvements); Hilt, 41
Wash. App. at 435-36, 704 P.2d at 673 (noting that woman had made payments out of separate
checking account toward real estate contract in man's name).
136. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 300-01, 678 P.2d 328, 329 (1984);
Sutton, 85 Wash. App. at 491, 933 P.2d at 1071; In re Estate of Anderson, No. 14572-7-I1 1997
WL 6984, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1997); DeHollander,53 Wash. App. at 696 -97, 770 P.2d at
639-40.
137. See, e.g., Pennington v. Pennington, 93 Wash. App. 913, 919, 971 P.2d 98, 99 (1999)
(finding relationship not meretricious where man purchased new home, executed loan documents,
took title in his name only, and paid solely with his separate property); Fletcher v. Olmstead, No.
19319-1-11, 1996 WL 734263, at *1-2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1996) (finding relationship not
meretricious where leases to parties' apartments were never in both names and man purchased timeshare unit in his name, making clear to seller that woman would have no interest in property).
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meretricious relationship to exist where the man was the sole wage
13
earner in the relationship and the woman took care of the household. 1
Other cases found meretricious relationships to exist where the woman
worked at the man's business for little or no pay, 139 or140where the parties
pooled labor to improve one party's separate property.
d.

OtherFactorsRelevant to the Marital-LikeRequirement

In Washington, there are statutory limitations on who may marry that
courts appear to have considered relevant in determining whether a
relationship is sufficiently marital-like to be meretricious. To marry,
parties must be over the age of eighteen and mentally competent.' 4'
Further, neither party may be married to another person, the parties must
be of the opposite sex, and the parties must not be nearer of kin than
second cousins.t41
Four cases have considered whether a meretricious relationship
existed where one of the cohabitants had separated from, but was still
married to, another person. 143 Three of these cases held that a
meretricious relationship existed. 44 Pennington held otherwise, finding
significant the man's marriage to another woman during the first five
years of cohabitation and his repeated refusal to marry after his
45
divorce. 1
No court has ruled on whether a same-sex couple could be involved in
a meretricious relationship. However, in an unpublished decision the

138. See Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 301, 678 P.2d at 329; Zion Constr., 78 Wash. App. at 90-91,
895 P.2d at 866; Warden v. Warden, 36 Wash. App. 693, 694, 676 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1984).
139. See Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 344, 898 P.2d 831, 833 (1995); Chesterfield,96
Wash. App. at 108, 978 P.2d at 553-54; In re Marriage of Kinzer, No. 16035-1-IH, 1998 WL
151795, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1998); In re Marriage of Damon-Rau, No. 19860-6-11, 1997
WL 671997, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1997).
140. See supranote 117 and accompanying text.
141. See Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010(1) (1998).
142. See Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.020 (1998).
143. See Pennington v. Pennington, 93 Wash. App. 913, 917 P.2d 98 (1999); Kinzer, 1998 WL
151795; Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App. 880, 812 P.2d 523 (1991); Warden, 36 Wash. App. 693,
676 P.2d 1037.
144. See Kinzer, 1998 WL 151795, at *2; Foster, 61 Wash. App. at 884, 812 P.2d at 525;
Warden, 36 Wash. App. at 696, 676 P.2d at 1038-39.
145. See Pennington,93 Wash. App. at 919, 971 P.2d at 102.
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court of appeals addressed the issue in dictum, inserting the words "of
the opposite sex" into the definition of meretricious relationship.' 46
The PartiesMust Cohabitwith Knowledge That a Lawful Marriage
Between Them Does Not Exist

3.

For a relationship to be meretricious, the parties must know that they
are not lawfully married. 1 This presumably distinguishes a meretricious
relationship from an "innocent relationship."' 48 The distinction is
significant because the property before the court on the annulment of an
innocent relationship includes both separate and community property. 49
III. ALTHOUGH CONNELL IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION, IT FALLS SHORT OF ITS GOALS
Though an improvement over the Creasman presumption and its
various exceptions, Connell falls short of its goals. Creasman instructed
courts to award property to the title-holding party at the termination of a
Although courts recognized several
meretricious relationship.'
exceptions to Creasman'stitle rule,' the doctrine continued to make the
law "unpredictable and at times onerous."'5 2 Connell puts Washington at
the forefront of recognizing the legal rights of cohabitants, 53 and in cases
where a meretricious relationship exists, Connell achieves an equitable
outcome by definition.M However, for nonmeretricious relationships, the
meretricious relationship fiction promotes unpredictability and inequity.

146. See Kinzer, 1998 WL 151795, at *2.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See supranote 56 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 26-27 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 26-27 and accompanying text; see also Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.080 (1998).
See supranotes 22-23 and accompanying text.

151. See supranotes 26-36 and accompanying text.
152. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 304, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (1984).
153. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, MaritalPropertyRights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 21, 7178 (1994).
154. But see Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 354-55, 898 P.2d 831, 838 (1995) (Utter,
J., dissenting) (arguing that it often may be impossible to carry out Lindsey's ' just and equitable
distribution" requirement while limiting distribution to only pseudo-community property).
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The MeretriciousRelationshipFiction Causes Uncertainty

The meretricious relationship fiction creates a high degree of
uncertainty for parties contemplating or currently cohabiting, for
attorneys advising those parties, and for trial judges applying the
concept. There are no clear rules delineating when a meretricious
relationship begins. When parties marry, the marriage ceremony marks
the precise moment when community property begins to accumulate and
the other legal consequences of marriage arise. On the other hand, unless
the parties contract to live in a meretricious relationship,15 5 a relationship
does not become meretricious until the court determines so, generally
after the relationship has ended. Moreover, Connell requires courts to
look at the entire cohabitation and determine whether, as a whole, it was
sufficiently stable and marital-like to have been meretricious. 5 6 To make
matters worse, the supreme court has not spoken on the respective
weights of the relevant factors. 57 Finally, because courts must determine
on a case-by-case basis whether a meretricious relationship exists,'58
precedent is of little value. Thus, short of an express agreement,
cohabitants have little means of knowing whether their relationship is
meretricious.
Another source of uncertainty is that meretricious relationship
property rights arise under common law and not statute. Consequently,
many cohabitants may not realize they are incurring any legal obligations
or gaining any legal rights. Further, parties are less able than married
couples to predict which rights and obligations are triggered by
involvement in a meretricious relationship. Courts have held that
involvement in a meretricious relationship is not equivalent to "marital
status" or "spouse" under a number of statutes.'5 9 However, no court has
considered whether it may award separate maintenance on the
termination of a meretricious relationship. No published opinion has
squarely addressed whether Connell's just and equitable distribution
applies on the death of one or both parties to a meretricious relationship,
whether each is entitled to one-half of the pseudo-community property,
or whether each has no interest in the property that would be pseudo-

155. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
156. See supranotes 55-57 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
159. See supranote 68 and accompanying text.
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community if they separated, but which is the separate property of the
other spouse."6 Finally, no court has addressed whether parties or their
creditors have a present interest in pseudo-community property, and
whether the participants have the right to bequeath and devise any shares
they may have in it.
The supreme court's definition of meretricious relationship includes
several ambiguous terms that have resulted in conflicting interpretations
by the court of appeals. One element of the definition requires that the
parties' relationship be marital-like.'6 1 In applying this element, most
cases have focused on whether the parties' relationship is functionally
equivalent to marriage. 62 However, several cases have applied the
marital-like element formalistically. Dictum from one case suggests that
a same-sex relationship can never be meretricious, regardless of how
functionally marital-like it is.163 Similarly, Pennington considered one
party's marriage to another during the first part of cohabitation and that
party's rejection of the other's requests for marriage as evidence against
the existence of a meretricious relationship."6 These conflicting
approaches tend to make the existence of a meretricious relationship
dependent on the approach of a particular court.
Two cases illustrate the unpredictable results of these divergent
approaches. In Foster v. Thilges,"65 the parties cohabited for approximately ten years, first in the woman's home and later in a home they
built together." They established joint bank accounts, pooled incomes,
obtained a joint home loan, held themselves out as husband and wife at
various social and community activities, and were engaged. 67 Even
though the man was legally married to another woman for the first part
of the cohabitation, the court of appeals affirmed a just and equitable
distribution.'68
The facts in Pennington are quite similar. The parties were sexually
intimate, cohabited for ten years, made a major move together,
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 116-40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
164. See Pennington v. Pennington, 93 Wash. App. 913, 920, 971 P.2d 98, 102 (1999).
165. 61 Wash. App. 880, 812 P.2d 523 (1991).
166. See id.at 881, 812 P.2d at 524.
167. See id
168. See id at 885, 812 P.2d at 526.

160.
161.
162.
163.
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entertained friends and family as a couple, and jointly made
improvements to their residence. 69 The woman quit her job to care for
the man after his stroke, worked at the man's business, sometimes for a
low salary, and used the man's surname on her credit cards. 7 ' The local
phone book listed them together under the man's surname and members
of the community testified that they cared for each other as husband and
wife.' 7' In contrast to Foster, however, the court found that a
meretricious relationship did not exist, largely because the man remained
married to another woman during the first five years of their cohabitation
and refused to marry the woman after his divorce.'72 Although
Pennington purported to distinguish Foster,'73 it is difficult to see how a
just and equitable distribution is appropriate in one case and not the
other.
Two other elements of the definition also leave room for conflicting
interpretations. Connell requires a meretricious relationship to be stable,
but does not define stable. 74 In determining stability, courts have
considered the duration of the relationship,'75 whether the parties
continuously cohabited,'76 whether they ever cohabited with others
during the relationship,' 77 and whether the relationship was "stormy."' 78
However, without a conclusive definition of stable from the supreme
court, courts will continue to determine stability based on limited
precedent and their own subjective definitions. Connell also requires that
a meretricious relationship involve cohabitation, without defining the
term.'7 9 Although court of appeals precedent suggests that cohabitation
requires sexual intimacy18 ° and sharing the same permanent address, 8'
without a definition, a court could find cohabitation when the parties

169. See Pennington,93 Wash. App. at 914-15, 971 P.2d at 99-100.
170. See id.
at 915-16, 971 P.2d at 99-100.
171. See id. at 916, 971 P.2d at 100.
172. See id. at 920, 971 P.2d at 102.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id.
at 919, 971 P.2d at 102.
See Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (1995).
See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.

180. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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merely spent the night at each other's residences frequently, or even in
the absence of intimacy.
B.

The MeretriciousRelationship Concept Is Inequitable

The meretricious relationship fiction is inconsistent with Connell's
goals of preventing unjust enrichment'1 2 and achieving equity. These
goals are met when the court performs a just and equitable distribution at
the end of a meretricious relationship because the result is equitable by
definition."8 However, the negative implication of Connell requires
courts to award property to the title-holding party at the end of a
nonmeretricious relationship, unless the other party can assert a claim
under another theory. 85 Thus, equity turns on whether a given
relationship is meretricious or whether an alternate theory of recovery is
available.
To the extent that courts require cohabitation to last a minimum
duration before the relationship can be meretricious, an equitable
outcome turns on satisfying the duration requirement rather than on the
merits of the case."8 6 For example, assume that a couple cohabited for six
months before separating and in all other respects had a marital-like
relationship. Assume further that the woman did not do paid work during
that time, instead taking care of the household, while the man continued
his paid work. If the man kept his earnings in a separate account, title
will not reflect the woman's nonmonetary contributions to their
relationship. It is unlikely that a court would find this hypothetical
relationship meretricious under current law because cohabitation lasted
only six months. 87 As such, there is no pseudo-community property and
the woman is not entitled to a just and equitable distribution. Her sole
remedy would lie in one of the various Creasman exceptions, 8 8 which
would require tracing the purchase of assets to her separate funds;
establishing a joint venture, implied partnership, or contract; or
establishing that a trust relation exists between the parties. However, it is

182. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
But see supra note 154.
See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.

187. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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unlikely she would prevail under any of these theories because her
contributions did not relate to a mutual business endeavor, she cannot
trace the major asset of the relationship-the man's earnings-to her
separate property, and the elements of a constructive or resulting trust are
not present. She might try to establish that their arrangement was an
implied contract, but there is no precedent for such a claim in
Washington. Moreover, even if she were able to establish such a claim,
she would have a contractual remedy rather than the right to a just and
equitable distribution.
A requirement that the relationship satisfy the statutory requirements
of marriage also defeats Connell's goals. Imagine a cohabitation of ten
years, similar in all other respects to the previous hypothetical except that
the parties are of the same sex. Under the Division Three Court of
Appeals definition of meretricious relationship," 9 a court could not
perform a just and equitable distribution of what would have been the
parties' pseudo-community property, regardless of the relationship's
functional and economic similarity to marriage. Such a result promotes
rather than prevents inequity and unjust enrichment.
The Pennington decision further highlights the inequities of the
meretricious relationship requirement. The court reversed the finding of a
meretricious relationship on several grounds: the parties were legally
unable to marry because the man was married to another woman for the
first five years of their relationship; the man repeatedly refused the
woman's requests that they marry, even after his marriage was dissolved;
and the woman lived with another man for one month during their ten
year cohabitation. 90 Thus, despite that these facts have little bearing on
whether the manner in which assets were held at the end of their
relationship was equitable, the court reversed the trial court's just and
equitable distribution of property. Pennington's approach elevates form
over substance, disregards Connell's instruction that "a meretricious
relationship is not the same as a marriage,'' l and makes equity partly
dependent on the court's subjective moral attitudes towards the propriety
of the relationship. To consider whether the parties are legally able to
marry, actually intend to marry, or cohabit exclusively with one another

189. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
190. See Pennington v. Pennington, 93 Wash.App. 913, 918-19, 971 P.2d 98, 101 (1995).
191. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339,348, 898 P.2d 831, 835 (1995).
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in determining whether a relationship is meretricious is to misunderstand
Connell: it is an equitable doctrine, not a common-law marriage. 92
IV. COURTS SHOULD PERFORM A JUST AND EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION ON THE TERMINATION OF ANY INTIMATE
COHABITATION
A. Proposal
Although Connell yields equitable results upon termination of those
cohabitations determined to be meretricious, 93 the duration factor and a
formalistic marital-like test frustrate equity. Moreover, the fiction renders
all cohabitant property rights far too unpredictable. The supreme court
should replace the meretricious relationship requirement with a rule
requiring courts to perform a just and equitable distribution of pseudocommunity property on the termination, by separation or death, of any
"intimate cohabitation." The court should also clarify that the pseudocommunity property concept should apply only for purposes of a just and
equitable distribution. Similar to a non-acquiring spouse's interest in
quasi-community property, 94 a cohabitant's right to pseudo-community
property should be inchoate until one or both parties petition the court for
a just and equitable distribution on the termination of cohabitation. There
should not be a present interest in or right to bequeath or devise pseudocommunity property. Moreover, pseudo-community property should
accumulate only during periods in which the parties actually cohabit.
It is equally important that the supreme court identify factors that
would guide lower courts in making a just and equitable distribution. In
addition to the Connell factors, 95 trial courts should consider the parties'
expectations upon beginning cohabitation, and any representations they
made to each other. Courts should also consider "through whom the
property was acquired, monetary and labor contributions, whether or not
children were born of the relationship and who is to care for them, and
192. A few states recognize "common-law marriages," where parties may become legally married

without a formal marriage ceremony or state licensure if they mutually agree to marry, have a
permanent relationship, and hold themselves out publicly as husband and wife. See, e.g., In re Estate
of Stinchcomb, 674 P.2d 26, 28-29 (Okla. 1983). Washington does not recognize common-law
marriages. See In re McLaughlin's Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 591-92, 30 P. 651, 658-59 (1892).
193. But see supra note 154.
194. See supranote 66.

195. See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
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the general condition in which the termination of the relationship will
leave each of the parties."' 96
B.

This ProposalPromotes Certainty

In at least three respects, this proposal will ensure that courts resolve
property rights following cohabitation in a predictable manner. First,
under this approach, a relationship must meet only three straightforward
requirements for Connell's equitable principles to apply. The parties
must be intimate. While the presence or absence of sexual relations
should not be determinative of intimacy, it is a weighty factor, as is the
parties' holding themselves out as a couple and sharing the same
bedroom. The parties must also cohabit. For purposes of this proposal,
cohabitation requires living permanently and regularly in the same
residence, and does not include dating where the parties spend the night
at one another's residence, even if this occurs frequently. Finally, the
parties must not have made a written and enforceable agreement to the
contrary.

97

The second advantage of this proposal over the meretricious
relationship fiction is that intimate cohabitation, unlike a meretricious
relationship, would begin at a precise moment: when two romantically
involved persons begin living in the same permanent residence together.
Therefore, there would be little doubt whether a relationship qualifies for
a just and equitable distribution.
Finally, this proposal would clearly define the property rights of
intimate cohabitants. There would be no present interest in pseudocommunity property; rather, similar to courts' use of quasi-community
property,'98 a court would perform the characterization solely for the
purpose of determining the property before it for the just and equitable
distribution.

196. Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059-60 (1976) (quoting
Note, Meretricious Relationships-PropertyRights: A Meretricious Relationship May Create an
Implied Partnership-Inre Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972), 48 Wash. L.
Rev. 635, 644 n.44 (1973)).
197. See supra note 53.
198. See supranote 66.

1270

Cohabitant Property Rights
C.

This ProposalPromotesEquity

This proposal would equitably resolve the property rights of
cohabitants upon separation or death in all cases brought before courts.'
Under this proposal, statutory restrictions on marriage, such as whether
the parties are of the same sex or are married to other persons, would
have no bearing on courts' ability to perform a just and equitable
distribution."0 While these statutory restrictions represent a clear public
policy against allowing certain individuals to marry, Connell is an
equitable doctrine and cohabitation is not the same as a marriage.2"'
This proposal would also require courts to perform a just and
equitable distribution of pseudo-community property on the termination
of all intimate cohabitations, not just those of a specific duration. This
may seem burdensome at first glance. However, this proposal does not
require that courts redistribute property in all cases. For some intimate
cohabitations, a just and equitable distribution may result in the titleholding party retaining title. Moreover, for cohabitations that are of short
duration and where there is no significant commingling of assets between
parties, courts may instead, if equitable, attempt to place the parties in
the position they would have occupied had no cohabitation taken
place.

20 2

199. Not all parties will petition a court for distribution of property acquired during cohabitation.
Some parties may mutually agree to a specific distribution without coming before a court. Other
parties may simply walk away from the relationship without reaching agreements with their former
cohabitants and without petitioning a court for distribution. In such cases, the doctrine of laches
should apply to determine when a cohabitant may assert his or her rights under Connell.
200. Situations may arise where a legal wife (or husband) and the cohabitant partner of his or her
spouse may have conflicting claims to the married cohabitant's earnings. Often in these
circumstances the marriage will be defunct and the marital community will have ceased to exist. See
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.140 (1998). This will not always be the case, however. Courts should
protect the noncohabiting spouse's community property rights when making the Connell just and
equitable distribution by distributing only the cohabiting spouse's one-half share of property that is
both community property and "pseudo-community property," and by taking this factor into account
when making the Connelljust and equitable distribution.
201. See supranote 65 and accompanying text.
202. Courts in Alaska and Oregon apply a similar doctrine in dissolution of marriages. See, e.g.,
Rose v. Rose, 755 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Alaska 1988) (holding that where parties' marriage lasted only
18 months, each brought substantial separate assets into marriage, there was minimal commingling
of assets, the parties had no children together, both were employed, and they maintained separate
checking accounts into which they deposited their earnings, trial court did not abuse discretion in
treating property division in nature of rescission, aimed at placing parties in financial position they
would have occupied had no marriage taken place); In re Marriage of Jenks, 656 P.2d 286,290 (Or.
1982) ("[I]f the marriage is terminated before the parties' financial affairs become commingled or
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Applying the intimate cohabitation rule to Pennington. 3 illustrates its
simplicity and equity. Under this proposal, the trial court would have the
ability to perform a just and equitable distribution solely by virtue of the
parties' mutual decision to cohabit. Neither the parties' having lived
apart periodically during their cohabitation nor the woman's having lived
with another man for one month would impede the parties' right to an
equitable distribution. Rather, these facts would merely be factors
considered by the court in making the just and equitable distribution.
Moreover, because property earned during the periods of separation is
separate rather than pseudo-community, it would not be before the court
for the just and equitable distribution. Finally, during the one month
when the woman cohabited with another man, she and the other man
would be involved in an intimate cohabitation, for which a court should
perform a just and equitable distribution of the pseudo-community
property of that cohabitation.
V.

CONCLUSION

In overruling Creasman, the Supreme Court of Washington sought to
resolve in an equitable and predictable manner the property rights of
cohabitants upon separation without equating cohabitation with marriage.
However, the meretricious relationship fiction adopted by the Connell
court propagates uncertainty because its definition and factors for
consideration are subjective, ambiguous, and have been interpreted
inconsistently by the court of appeals. The standard also promotes
inequitable results in many cases. When courts hold a cohabitation
nonmeretricious because it did not last long enough or because the
parties were not legally able to marry or did not intend to marry, equity
hinges on satisfying these arbitrary criteria that are only tangentially
related to the merits of the case. Therefore, the supreme court should
replace Connell's meretricious relationship fiction with a rule requiring
courts to perform a just and equitable distribution on the termination of
any intimate cohabitation. Because the parties' mutual agreement to live
together, not an after-the-fact determination, would trigger application of
Connell's equitable principles, the intimate cohabitation rule would
enhance the predictability of cohabitant property rights. The rule would

committed to the needs of children to the point that the parties cannot readily be restored to their
premarital situations, then property division is a relatively simple task in the nature of rescission.").
203. See supra notes 1, 97-103, 169-71, 190, and accompanying text.
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also make these rights more equitable because a court would perform a
just and equitable distribution at the termination of any intimate
cohabitation. The adoption of this proposal would not only compensate
for Connell's shortcomings, but more importantly, it would solidify
Washington's position as a frontrunner in recognizing and protecting the
legal rights of all cohabitants.
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